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This paper provides a tractable search model with divisible money that encompasses the two frameworks currently
used in the literature. In the model, individuals belong to many villages. Inside a village, individuals are not altruistic
as in a representative household, but they share information so ￿nancial contracts are feasible. Money is essential
in the model to facilitate trade with individuals outside the village. The framework proposed by Lagos and Wright
(2002) arises as a special case if some goods trade in competitive markets while others trade in search markets, and
preferences are quasi-linear. The framework proposed by Shi (1997) arises as a special case if individuals can insure
trading risks inside the village. In general, if preferences are not quasi-linear and trading risks cannot be insured, the
distribution of money holdings is non-degenerate and monetary transfers have distributional effects. However, neither
quasi-linear preferences nor insurance of trading risks are necessary for tractability. Indeed, this paper advances a
tractable benchmark with an endogenous frequency of shopping in which all buyers choose to carry the same amount
of money even if preferences are not quasi-linear and trading risks cannot be insured.
11 Introduction
Monetary search models have provided rich insights on the foundations of money, and they have become the dominant
paradigm in this ￿eld of economics. To facilitate tractability, early monetary search models made strong assumptions
on the properties of money (indivisibility and limited storage capacity). These strong assumptions prevented the study
of many interesting issues such as the effects of in￿ation. Thanks to the work of Shi (1997) and Lagos and Wright
(2002), we have now two distinct frameworks that yield tractable monetary search models with divisible money.
Both frameworks use a trick to obtain a tractable distribution of money balances. In the case of Shi, the trick is the
assumption that individuals belong to large households. In the case of Lagos and Wright, the trick is the assumption
that utility is linear on a good traded in a competitive market. Despite the many accomplishments on the rich literate
that has followed the seminal contributions of Shi and Lagos and Wright, there is a major unresolved problem. Quite
often a model in one of these two frameworks obtains a conclusion that contradicts the ￿ndings of a model in the
other framework. For example, Shi (1997) argues that a positive rate of in￿ation is likely to be optimal, while Lagos
and Wright (2002) argues that the costs of in￿ation are much larger than previously thought. Since both frameworks
are built around different tricks, it is dif￿cult to trace the ultimate reasons for these disparate ￿ndings. The present
paper introduces a comprehensive framework that encompasses those advanced by Shi (1997), and Lagos and Wright
(2002). This framework is useful not only to compare these earlier models, but also to enrich the set of issues that can
be dealt with monetary search models.
In the model of this paper, individuals belong to villages.1 Each village contains a large number of individuals, but
it is only a small part of the global economy. In a village, individuals are not altruistic as in a household, but they know
their neighbors affairs. Therefore, ￿nancial contracts such as insurance and credit are feasible among individuals of
the same village. Despite the existence of a rich set of ￿nancial contracts inside the village, money is still essential to
facilitate trade with anonymous individuals from other villages.
Lagos and Wright (2002) is a special case of this paper￿s model if individuals trade competitively in the village
during the day, trade in search markets outside the village during the night, and the utility for one of the commodities
traded during the day is linear (quasi-linear preferences). Relaxing the quasi-linearity of preferences is important for
several reasons. Quasi-linear preferences imply risk neutrality, so these preferences rule out most of the issues dealt in
￿nancial economics. Also, quasi-linear preferences rule out wealth effects on all goods except for the one that yields
linear utility. This hinders the study of many interesting issues such as balanced growth and the endogenous frequency
of shopping studied in Section 3.
Shi (1997) is a special case of this paper￿s model if there iscomplete information inside a village, so individuals can
perfectly insure risky trading opportunities. The idea that the large household construct is a way to implicitly insure
trading risks goes as far back as Lucas (1990). The present contribution takes seriously Lucas￿s idea and ￿eshes out
1 Jin and Temzelides (2004) advance also a random search model with villages to generate equilibria where money is used in some exchanges
while credit is used in some others. However, they do not attempt to use villages to make tractable the divisibility of money. In their model,
both money and goods are indivisible, and credit is a gift giving equilibrium with trigger strategies.
2the mechanisms that arise in the village to insure trading risks. There are several advantages on explicitly designing
these mechanisms. Typically, the mechanisms for insuring trading risks are ￿nancial contracts which are interesting
on themselves. Moreover, once we are explicit about the extend of risk sharing in the village, there is no ambiguity on
the objectives of buyers and sellers when they interact in the money market. Finally, and most importantly, one can
vary the information that is shared inside the villages to ￿nd out if the abstraction of trading risks is relevant or not to
a particular issue.
If preferences are not quasi-linear and trading risks cannot be insured, the distribution of money holdings in the
search market is non-degenerate. In general, this reduces the tractability of the model dramatically. However, neither
quasi-linear preferences nor insurance of trading risks are necessary for tractability. Indeed, this paper advances a
simple benchmark with an endogenous frequency of shopping in which all buyers choose to carry the same amount
of money even if preferences are not quasi-linear and trading risks cannot be insured. In this simple benchmark, the
distributional effects of monetary policy are irrelevant for the performance of monetary markets.
In summary, the present model provides a unifying framework for tractable search monetary models with divisible
money. This framework ￿eshes out the ￿nancial contracts required to obtain a degenerate distribution of money
holdings. This framework also leads to new results such as the simple benchmark with an endogenous frequency of
shopping presented in this paper. The present framework should be particularly useful to combine money and ￿nance
and to embed a tractable monetary search market into macroeconomic models where typically risk aversion and wealth
effects are respectively important.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model of this paper is analyzed in Section 2. This model
generalizes the attractive version of Lagos and Wright (2002) found in Rocheteau and Wright (2003). Section 3 studies
a variation of the model in Section 2 in which all goods are traded in monetary search markets and individuals decide
how often they go shopping. The solution to this model is equivalent to the solution by Rauch (2000) of the Shi (1997)
model. Section 4 shows that an endogenous frequency of shopping makes the insurance of trading risks redundant
under quite general conditions. Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
2 The Model
The economy is composed of a large number of symmetric villages. Each village contains many individuals (a con-
tinuum) who can be of two types: buyers and sellers. All members of a village have complete information about their
mutual actions and their histories, but individuals are anonymous outside their village. Time is discrete and the hori-
zon is in￿nite. Each period consists of two subperiods: day and night. During the day, all the individuals can produce
and consume a general nondurable good, which is traded in a frictionless competitive market. Also, during the day
individuals trade competitively with their fellow villagers a set of ￿nancial contracts to be speci￿ed below. During the
night, individuals trade nondurable goods speci￿c to each village. These goods are traded in search markets. Sellers
are able to produce the good speci￿c to their own village. Buyers get utility from the speci￿c goods produced in other
villages. Neither buyers nor sellers get utility from the speci￿c good from their own village. The measures of buyers
3and sellers are exogenous and normalized to 1. The probabilities that a buyer and a seller meet a suitable trading
partner are respectively αb and αs.
Inthisenvironment, thereisaroleformoneytofacilitatetradebecauseatnightthereisalackofdoublecoincidence
of wants in all possible bilateral trading meetings and buyers are anonymous outside their village. Money is an
intrinsically useless, perfectly divisible, and storable asset. The money supply grows at a constant factor γ such that
M+1 = γM,w h e r eM is the quantity of money per buyer. The subscript t is omitted in most expressions of the paper,
so, for example, M stands for Mt and M+1 stands for Mt+1. New money is injected via lump-sum transfers to buyers
at the beginning of each day. Money is the numeraire.
The instantaneous utility of a buyer is:
Ub(x,y,q)=v(x) − w(y)+u(q); (1)
where x and y are respectively quantities consumed and produced of the general good, q is the quantity consumed of
speci￿c goods from other villages. Likewise, the instantaneous utility of a seller is:
Us(x,y,q)=v(x) − w(y) − c(q); (2)
Buyers and sellers maximize their expected utilities: E
P∞
t=0 β
tUi (xt,y t,q t),f o ri = b and s, and β ∈ (0,1) is
the discount factor. The functions v, w, u, and c are all bounded, continuously differentiable, and increasing. The
function v is concave, u is log-concave, and w and c are convex. Moreover, v(0) = w(0) = u(0) = c(0) = 0,
w0(0) = c0(0) = 0, and v0(0) = u0(0) = ∞. The discount and money growth factors obey γ>β .
Individuals are not risk neutral as in Rocheteau and Wright (2003), so there are gains from insuring with fellow
villagers the risks faced in the search markets. To this end, buyers can purchase a contract for the delivery of µb dollar
next morning contingent upon meeting a seller during the night. Likewise, sellers can purchase a contract for the
delivery of µs dollars next morning contingent upon failing to meet a buyer during the night. The fair premiums to
acquire these contracts are respectively µbαb and µs (1 − αs). These premiums are also payable next morning.
In addition to insurance contracts, credit is viable inside the village. For concreteness, I assume that individuals
can issue one period risk free nominal discount bonds that promise one unit of money next morning. These bonds
trade in competitive markets inside the village at a price (1 + r)
−1 . Outside the village, these personal bonds are not
valued because potential buyers do not know the issuer of these bonds. Initial bond holdings are assumed to be zero.
The concept of equilibrium combines competitive markets during the day with Nash bargaining at night. In equilib-
rium, buyers and sellers make optimal choices given the environment where they live. This environment includes the
sequence of general good prices: {pt}
∞
t=0 and the rules describing how the bargaining outcomes depend on the assets
held by buyers and sellers. These prices and these rules must be consistent with market clearing and Nash bargaining.
For simplicity, I focus on symmetric and stationary equilibria where all individuals of the same type behave identically
and real allocations are constant over time.
4To ￿nd an equilibrium, I adopt the following widely used strategy. First, I make a conjecture on the rate of
in￿ation, other individuals behavior, and the bargaining rules. Given this conjecture, I then solve for the optimal
behavior of a representative buyer and a representative seller. Finally, I check that when individuals behave optimally
and symmetrically the initial conjecture is consistent with market clearing, Nash bargaining, and stationarity.
The conjecture about in￿ation is that the price of the general good increases at the same rate as the money supply:
p+1 = γp. The conjecture about other individuals is that, at the night market, sellers carry no money balances, while
buyers carry an amount of money Mb that grows at the rate γ over time. Finally, the conjecture about bargaining is
that the output and the money exchanged in a trading meeting (q,d) depend only on the quantity of money that the
buyer carries and the price p+1. The quantity q is a function of mb/p+1, and the payment d is a linerarly homogeneous






, and d = ￿ d(mb,p +1), (3)
In addition, these functions satisfy the following properties. If mb/p+1 is smaller or equal than a ￿xed threshold z∗,
then the buyer spends all the money that carries (d = mb), and q is an increasing, concave, and differentiable function
of mb/p+1.I fmb/p+1 is greater or equal than z∗, then the buyer spends d = p+1z∗ ≤ mb to obtain a ￿xed amount
of output q = q∗ and keeps the remaining money balances. Finally, at mb =0 , ￿ q(0) = ￿ d(0,p +1)=0 .
2.1 The Behavior of Buyers
A representative buyer that starts the morning with wealth ωb
0 faces the following budget constraint:
xb +
mb + ab (1 + r)
−1
p
= yb + ωb
0, mb ≥ 0, (4)
where xb and yb are respectively the consumption and the production of general goods during the day, and mb and ab
are respectively the dollars and bonds acquired during the day. The buyer is aware that the outcome of bargaining in




solves the following maximization program:
V b(ωb
0)= m a x
{xb,yb,mb,µb}









subject to (3) and (4). The terms ωb0 and ωb1 denote the wealth next morning. The superscripts b1 and b0 denote
respectively the existence or not of a trading opportunity. Therefore,
ωb0 =









where τ denotes the monetary transfers from the government.
Standard recursive dynamic arguments show that V b is a well de￿ned value function that depends on ωb
0. Further-
more, V b is concave and continuously differentiable.
5To solve (5), the buyer must behave as follows. Because of the concavity of V b the buyer must fully insure the risk
on trading opportunities:
µb = d. (8)
Therefore, the quantity of money held in the next morning is mb − dαb + τ regardless of meeting a seller or not,
so ωb0 = ωb1 ≡ ωb. Also, the buyer must equate the marginal utility of consumption to the marginal desutility of
production:
v0(xb)=w0(yb) (9)
Finally, using the Envelope Theorem V b0 ¡
ab¢
= w0(yb
+1), the buyer must demand bonds and money to satisfy the
following conditions:

























Equation (10) is a standard Euler condition equating the marginal utility of consuming the general good with the
marginal utility of acquiring bonds to consume tomorrow. Condition (11) equates the marginal cost and the marginal
bene￿t of acquiring money. The cost is the desutility of producing the general good. The bene￿t is the expected
increase in the consumer￿s surplus at night.
In a stationary equilibrium (yb = yb
+1), condition (10) implies that the demand for bonds is perfectly elastic (across
steady states) at β













0), then stationarity and condition (11) would also imply β = γ. The assumption γ>βrules out such a possibility.















2.2 The Behavior of Sellers
A representative seller that starts the morning with wealth ωs
0 faces the following budget constraint:
xs +
ms + as(1 + r)−1
p
= ys + ωs
0, ms ≥ 0, (14)
where xs and ys are respectively the consumption and the production of general goods during the day, and ms and as
are respectively the dollars and bonds acquired during the day. The seller is aware that the outcome of bargaining in
a trade meeting at night obeys (3), and she can purchase fair insurance on the event of meeting a seller. The optimal
choice of {xs,ys,m s,µ s} solves the following maximization program:
V s(ωs
0)= m a x
{xs,ys,ms,µs}






6subject to (15) and (3). The terms ωs0 and ωb1 denote the wealth next morning. The superscripts s1 and s0 denote
respectively the existence or not of a trading opportunity. Therefore,
ωs0 =




as + ms + d − µs (1 − αs)
p+1
. (17)
Recursive dynamic arguments show that V s is a well de￿ned value function that depends on ωs
0. Furthermore, V s
is concave and continuously differentiable.
To solve (14), the seller must fully insure the risk of failing to meet a buyer because V s is concave:
µs = d. (18)
Therefore, the quantity of money held next morning is ms+dαs regardless of meeting a buyer or not, so ωs0 = ωs1 ≡
ωs. Also, the seller must equate the marginal utility of consumption to the marginal desutility of production:
v0(xs)=w0(ys) (19)
Finally, using the Envelope Theorem V s0 (ωs)=w0(ys
+1), the seller must demand bonds and money to satisfy the
following conditions:














ms =0 . (21)
In a stationary equilibrium, ys
+1 = ys and βp < p+1, so the demand for bonds is perfectly elastic at β
−1 =
(1 + r)p/p+1, and the demand for money is zero.
2.3 Generalized Nash Bargaining
This subsection characterizes the outcome of Nash bargaining when a buyer and a seller meet at night. Let Sb and
Ss be respectively the trading surpluses of the buyer and the seller. The generalized Nash bargaining outcome (q,d)





















Ss = β [V s (ωs) − V s (ωs − d)] − c(q) (24)














Without using these approximations, the model is still well de￿ned, but the solution must be numerical. These ap-
proximations turn into equalities, and so their use is fully justi￿e d ,i nt h ef o l l o w i n gt h r e ec a s e s .T h e￿rst justi￿cation
is that the value functions are a￿n. Lagos and Wright (2002) and Rocheteau and Wright (2003) provide an example
of this justi￿cation with quasi-linear preferences. Next section provides another example with endogenous shopping,
but the value functions V s and V b in this section are in general not a￿n. The second justi￿cation is that individuals
have insurance not only against the risk of meeting or not a trading partner, but also against the risk of failing to reach
a bargaining agreement with the trading partner. Of course, such an insurance generates all kinds of moral hazard
problems. To avoid these problems, insurance contracts must then specify in detail how individuals must act in all
eventualities. In the framework of a representative household, such a modeling strategy has lead to the critique that
individuals turn into machines. The third justi￿cation, which is the one to be adopted here, is that payment d is an
in￿nitessimal fraction of the comprehensive wealth of individuals. This comprehensive wealth, which includes the
present discounted value of all future production, is arbitrarily large as β −→ 1. Consequently, (25) and (26) are
justi￿ed when β is in a neighborhood of one, or equivalently, when the trading period is short.
Using (25) and (26) with equality, together with the Envelope Theorem, the trading surpluses of buyers and sellers
are the following:
























where z ≡ d/p+1. Let (q∗,z∗) be the solution to the system (29) and (30). Using the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, if
mb ≥ z∗p+1, then the Nash bargaining solution is unconstrained by d ≤ mb and the outcome is (q∗,z∗). In contrast,
if mb ≤ z∗p+1, then the Nash bargaining solution is constrained, so d = mb and q obeys (30) with z = mb/p+1.
As we saw in the previous section, the constrained solution is the relevant one in equilibrium. In this case, it is





8In the three justi￿cations provided for turning (25) and (26) into equalities, the values w0(ys) and w0(yb) are treated as
constant in a particular trading match. Also, in a constrained solution z = mb/p+1. Consequently, the function g(q)



















The concavity of ￿ q is equivalent to the convexity of g. Using the log-concavity of u, Lagos and Wright (2002) show
that g is convex for the special case w0(yb)=w0(ys)=1 . This result easily generalizes to w0(yb) and w0(ys) being
positive numbers, because if u is log-concave, then u times the value of the ratio w0(ys)/w0(yb) is also log-concave.
2.4 Equilibrium
The previous subsection shows that the conjectured properties on the terms of trade rules that we employed to solve the
optimization problems of buyers and sellers are consistent with generalized Nash bargaining if β is in a neighborhood
of one. The conjecture that prices increase at the rate γ is a direct implication of stationarity. Finally, optimal behavior
is consistent with the conjecture that sellers carry no money and buyers carry an amount that grows at the rate γ.





Combining the ￿rst order conditions (9), (19), and (13) with the constrained solution of Nash bargaining (32),
the market clearing condition for the general good, and the budget constraint of sellers with ms =0 ,a s =0 , and
ω0 = αsg(q), we obtain
v0(xb)=w0(yb) (33)
v0(xs)=w0(ys) (34)
xb + xs = yb + ys (35)










A simpler system characterizes an equilibrium in which bond positions of buyers and sellers are such that all
individuals share a common marginal value of general goods. In this simpler case, the equilibrium is described by
xb = xs = yb = ys, (39)
together with (33), (37), and (38)
93 Endogenous Shopping
This section presents a modi￿ed version of the previous model where individuals choose which role they play at the
search market. This analysis complements the previous section in two ways. In the previous section, credit contracts
were not used along the equilibrium path. In this section, credit contracts are the key ￿nancial arrangement between
the members of a village. In the previous section, the model extends the Rocheteau and Wright (2003) version of the
Lagos and Wright (2002) model. In this section, an equilibrium is equivalent to the Rauch (2000) solution to the Shi
(1997) model.
In the version of the model presented in this section, there are no general goods, and all the individuals have
symmetric preferences and abilities. All individuals are able to produce a good speci￿c to their village. Also, they all
get utility from the goods produced in other villages. However, nobody desires to consume the good produced in their
own village, so trade across villages is necessary to consume. This trade makes money essential because outside their
own village individuals are anonymous. Production must take place around the village of origin, so at the beginning
of each period each individual has to choose to either stay around the village as a seller or visit other villages as a
buyer. In each period, some individuals are buyers while the others are sellers. Over time, an individual alternates
between these two roles because he cannot afford being always a buyer, and he never consumes being always a seller.
The emphasis of the present model is to endogenize how often an individual plays each one of these roles.
The measure of individuals is one. The endogenous fraction of sellers is denoted as n, so the fraction of buyers is
1−n. Each period, buyers and sellers are randomly matched. The measure of trading matches, in which a buyer meets
a seller, is a function of n : α(n). The function α is assumed to be non-negative, continuously differentiable, concave,










Money is injected through lump-sum transfers received by all individuals at the beginning of a period. The growth
factor of the money supply is γ : M+1 = γM. Because of the absence of the general good, p has no meaning as a
price. However, to facilitate the comparison with the the previous model, I continue using p to de￿ate the value of
money. It turns out that a convient and simple de￿ator is the aggretate quantity of money, so I de￿ne p ≡ M.With this
de￿ator, the ratio m/p denotes the fraction of the money supply M that an individual holds. As it would be seen, this
fraction measures the purchasing power of the individual￿s money holdings.
3.1 Optimal Behavior
As in the previous section, I describe the optimal behavior of individuals in a conjectured environment. In this conjec-
ture, the terms of trade rules are summarized with the functions ￿ q and ￿ d in (3) that have the same properties as those
conjectured in the previous section. These properties imply that p correctly de￿ates the value of money in terms of






−1 − 1 is the real interest rate. Finally, other individual carry no money balances to the market if they decide
to be sellers, and carry a certain amount Mb that grows over time at the rate γ (Mb/p is constant). This conjectured
environmentis later shownto beconsistent withgeneralized Nashbargainingandstationarity, when individuals behave
optimally.
The optimal program of an individual is described as follows.
V (ω0)=m a x
'






























The wealth ω at the beginning of next period depends on if the individual chooses to be a buyer (superscript b)o ra
seller (superscript s). It also depends on if the individual found a trading partner (superscript 1) or not (superscript
0):
ωb1 =














as + ms + µsαs + τ
p+1
. (49)
The program (43) faces the following constraints: qb =￿ q(mb/p+1),d b = ￿ d(mb,p +1),q s =￿ q(Mb/p+1),d s =
￿ d(Mb,p +1),m b ≥ 0,m s ≥ 0, and the budgets:
mb + ab(1 + r)−1 = ω0p, and ms + as(1 + r)−1 = ω0p. (50)
In addition, next period wealth is bounded below by the condition that individuals must be able to repay their debts
with probability one without reliance to unbounded borrowing (No-Ponzi game condition):
ωi ≥ ω, for i ∈ {b1,b0,s1,s0}, (51)
where ω is an endogeneous lower bound on wealth. The value of ω depends crucially on the government transfers
and the existence of insurance. Without transfers (τ =0 ) and insurance, the lower bound ω is zero. With these
assumptions, an individual cannot guarantee having positive income in the future because sellers may have a long
11stream of bad outcomes in the market. Therefore, an individual cannot guarantee to be able to repay a positive debt
with probability one without runing a Ponzi game. Positive transfers and insurance on trading risks allow individuals
to issue risk free bonds up to the point that the interest on these bonds is equal to the guaranteed income of a seller
purchasing full insurance (µs = ds). Therefore, using (50) and (49) with ω0 = ωs0 = ω, µs = ds, ms =0 ,







Standard recursive dynamic arguments show that V is a well de￿ned concave value function that depends on ω0.
Using the method of undetermined coef￿cients, I will show that V has the following a￿n functional form for the
interval of wealth individuals hold in a stationary equilibrium:
V (ω0)=v0 + ω0, for ω0 ∈ [ω,ω]; (53)
where ω is de￿ned in (52) and ω is determined below. Figure 1 displays this value function.
Figure 1
12Intutitively, the function V depicted in Figure 1 is consistent with the following behavior. At ω, an individual can
only afford being a seller forever, so the utility is zero. In the upper interval [ω,∞), an individual is suf￿ciently rich
that will be a buyer in all future periods. In this interval, the money holdings mb and the output purchased qb are
increasing with wealth. The strict concavity of u implies the strict concavity of V if wealth is above ω. In the interval
(ω,ω), the individual alternates between being a buyer and a seller. Each period, the individual is indifferent between
these two roles as long as next period wealth remains in [ω,ω] with probability one. However, it is not optimal or
feasible behavior to escape this interval. At the lower bound, the individual is forced to either purchase insurance, or
go to the market as a seller, or both in order to satisfy (51). Crossing the upper bound ω violates the Euler equation,
which in this model is equivalent to the buyer-seller choice. To avoid crossing ω, it is optimal for an individual to
either purchase insurance, or go to the market as a buyer, or both. As long as wealth is in the interval (ω,ω), whenever
an individual goes to the market as a buyer carries an amount of money mb independent from wealth. Consequently,
richer individuals can expect to consume more often in the rest of their lives, but they consume the same amount each
time they do so.
As long as next period wealth remains in [ω,ω] with probability one, the functional form (53) implies that the


















































The values of µb and µs drop from (54) and (55). Therefore, individuals are indifferent between insuring their trading
risks as long as next period wealth remains in [ω,ω] with probability one. The optimal choice of mb and ms is
characterized by
ms =0since r =
γ − β
β






where z ≡ mb/p+1. The optimal values of ms and mb implied by (56) and (57) are independent of ω0.Therefore, in
an environment where (42) holds, we have
V b (ω0)=vb
0 + ω0, and V s (ω0)=vs
0 + ω0; (58)
where the values vb
0 and vs
0 are constants because τ/p+1 =( γ − 1)/γ, and the properties of ￿ q and ￿ d imply that
mb/p+1,q b,q s,d b/p+1,d s/p+1 are constant. Therefore, the functions in (??) together with (53) implies that V (ω0)
has the functional form in (53) with ω being the wealth that permits an individual to be a buyer in perpetuity when
(57) holds and the individually fully insures.
To con￿rm our conjecture about the validity of (53), it remains to show that if ω0 ∈ [ω,ω], then it is not feasible
or not optimal to make a choice that would lead to ω/ ∈ [ω,ω]. Choices that lead to ω<ωwith positive probability
13violate the No-Ponzi game condition (51). Furthermore, if ω0 >ω , the individual can always avoid violating (51)
by choosing to be a seller and insuring trading risks. Choices that lead to ω>ω with positive probability cannot
be optimal for the following reason. If there is a positive probability of entering the strictly concave region of V ,






In an environment where (42) holds, this equation is violated if V 0(ω0) >V0(ω), so ω ≤ ω.
3.2 Equilibrium
In a monetary equilibrium, there must be both buyers and sellers. For the coexistence of both roles, it is necessary that
vb
0 = vs
0. This implies that the following condition must hold:
αb (n)[u(q) − βz] − zr = αs (n)[βz − c(q)]. (60)
That is, n must be such that an individual must be indifferent between being a buyer or a seller.
Nash bargaining proceeds along the same lines as the previous section with the advantage that w0(yb)=w0(ys)





This validates the conjecture on terms of trade rules.
For existence of an equilibrium both sides of the equation in (60) must be non-negative otherwise an individual
would be better off dropping out of the market, this places a limit on r and so γ. Also, for an equilibrium to exists,
individuals must be willing to alternate between being buyers and sellers over time. Since individuals save when then
they are sellers and disave then they are buyers, the a￿nity of the value function V implies that individuals must be






Furthermore, (62) is consistent with optimal individual behavior, generalized Nash bargaining, and stationarity. This
validates the conjecture (42).
Using (12), (40), and (41) to simplify (60), we obtain the following two equations that determine n and q together

















14These equations are equivalent to the solution presented by Rauch (2000) of Shi (1997).2 The distribution of assets
across individuals in a stationary equilibrium is undetermined except for the fact that the wealth of individuals is in
the interval [ω,ω]. However, this distribution is irrelevant to ￿nd the values of n and q.This implies that as long as the
wealth of all inidividuals remains in [ω,ω], random redistributions of money at the beginning of a period are irrelevant
to characterize aggregate variables.
4 Financial Contracts versus Lotteries
One of the nice features of achieving tractability with the existence of ￿nancial contracts is that the effects of this
mechanism can be evaluated by simply assuming imperfect information inside the village. In general, the absence of
￿nancial contracts leads to models where the amounts of money carried by buyers are heterogeneous. Once buyers
hold divers money balances, models are typically much more dif￿cult to solve and quite often their analyses require
numerical methods. Interestingly, this is not the case in the simple model analyzed in the previous section. Even if
individuals are anonymous both inside and outside the village, fair lotteries are able to replace the role of ￿nancial
contracts. These lotteries demand no memory about personal histories, yet they lead to the same system of equations
(61) to (64) that characterizes an equilibrium.
The model in this section makes two modi￿cations to the model presented in the previous section. First, the
government can give lump-sum transfers but cannot impose lump-sum taxes, so the money supply can only grow:
γ ≥ 1. The importance of this modi￿cation is discussed below. Second, individuals have no access to credit and
insurance contracts, but individuals can play a fair lottery. A lottery ticket delivers an amount of money m with
probability π at a cost πm.
The absence of ￿nancial contracts implies that money is the only asset in the economy. Consequently, the state
variable measuring an individuals wealth is the real quantity of money at the beginning of a period. As it will be
con￿rmed with the method of undetermined coef￿cients, the value function has still the a￿nf o r m :V (ω)=v0 + ω in




, where mb/p is calculated below. Using this functional form








































subject to the terms of trade rules (3). Figure 2 represents the shape of these functions if the individual optimizes in an
equilibrium environment with both buyers and sellers active in the market.
Figure 2
2 Rauch adds barter and assumes linearity of u and symmetric bargaining.
15Both V s and V b are increasing functions of m. At the vertical axis, V s(0) − V b(0) is equal to the expected
seller￿s surplus, which must be positive in equilibrium, so V s(0) >Vb(0). The function V b is at least as steep as the
function V s, because money holdings increase the buyer￿s surplus but have no effect on the seller￿s surplus. Beyond
the quantity of money m∗, where Nash bargaining ceases to the constrained by the buyer￿s money, the two functions
have the same slope β/p+1.F i n a l l y ,V s and V b must cross otherwise there would be no buyers in the market.
In the absence of lotteries, an individual would choose to be a buyer if m<m 0 a n dt ob eas e l l e ri fm>m 0.At




by randomizing between V s(0) and V b ¡
mb/p+1
¢
. In this case, the individual uses all his money
holdings ω0p at the beginning of each period to buy a lottery ticket with a payoff mb, and probability of winning
ω0p/mb. If the individual wins the lottery becomes a buyer and if the individual loses the lottery become a seller.




, the individual solves the following program:







+( 1− π)V s (0), (67)
16subject to (3), the non-negativity of money balances, and the budget constraint.
πmb = ω0p. (68)
The ￿rst order conditions with respect to π and mb yield (57) and (60). These conditions imply that mb is independent




. This con￿rms that V is a￿n in this interval. As long as
the initial wealth is in this interval, mb is not affected by ω0 while π is a linear function of ω0.
After an analogous characterization of Nash bargaining, we obtain that q and n are still determined by the system
(61) to (64). Since sellers carry no money in equilibrium and all buyers carry the same amount, the equilibrium value
of mb/p, which is the share of money held by a buyer, must be (1 − n)
−1 .
In equilibrium, the wealth distribution at the beginning of next period is τ/p+1 for matched buyers and unmatched
sellers and mb/p+1 for the rest of individuals. Moreover, in a stationary equilibrium τ =( γ − 1)M and p+1 = γM,





























. Consequently, this con￿rms that
this is the relevant interval where value functions must be evaluated in equilibrium.
In conclusion, this is a very tractable model of divisible money without neither quasi-linear preferences nor implicit
or explicit insurance of trading risks. The feature of the model that delivers a constant marginal utility of wealth is the
endogeneous shopping frequency.
4.1 A Dif￿culty with the Optimum Quantity of Money
An interesting feature of the model is that monetary authorities cannot implement reductions on the quantity of money
with uniform lump-sum taxes (γ<1). A uniform lump-sum tax means that each individual must pay every period a
pre-ordanined amount of money. In the absence of ￿nancial contracts, an individual even if he goes to the market as
a seller every period, he can fail to earn income for an inde￿nite number of periods. When this happens the law of










, for t =0 ,1,2... (71)
If γ<1 and ω0 < 1,ω t drops down to zero asymptotically as t →∞ . In ￿nite time and hence positive probability,
the value ωt falls below the value of the lump-sum tax. Therefore, for an individual to avoid defaulting on the tax
obligations must maintain ω0 ≥ 1 at all times. Since ω0 is the ratio of money held by an individual over the average
quantity of money, for all individuals to be solvent with probability one, we need that they all hold the average quantity
of money at all times. This is impossible in this model with trading risks. Hence, there is no equilibrium with γ<1
if money must be reduced with a uniform lump-sum tax. This is reminiscent of the dif￿culty in implementing the
optimum quantity of money emphasized by Bewley (1983).
175 Conclusion
This paper provides a tractable search model with divisible money that encompasses Lagos and Wright (2002) and
Shi (1997). The key feature of the model is that individuals belong to many villages. Inside a village, individuals are
not altruistic as in a representative household, but they share information so ￿nancial contracts are feasible. Money is
essential in the model to facilitate trade with individuals outside the village. Rocheteau and Wright (2003) version of
Lagos and Wright (2002) arises as a special case if competitive markets coexist with search markets, and preferences
are quasi-linear. Rauch (2000) solution to Shi (1997) arises as a special case if individuals can insure trading risks
inside the village. In general, if preferences are not quasi-linear and trading risks cannot be insured, the distribution
of money holdings is non-degenerate and the model turns dif￿cult to solve. However, neither quasi-linear preferences
nor insurance of trading risks are necessary for tractability. A simple version of the model in which all buyers choose
to carry the same amount of money is tractable under quite general conditions even if preferences are not quasi-linear
and trading risks cannot be insured.
The type of ￿nancial arrangements that arise in the village are not always centered around the insurance of trading
risks as conjectured by Lucas (1990). In the version of the model in section 2, insurance is the key ￿nancial institution
that arises in equilibrium, but this is not the case in the versions in sections 3 and 4. In section 3, credit plays the key
role and insurance is only necessary to ensure the solvency of debtors. In section 4, insurance contracts are completely
unnecessary.
The coexistence of money and ￿nancial contracts allows an integration of the microfoundations of money and
￿nance. In a related paper, Faig (2004), I study a version of the model where the credit market in the village is
centered around banks because they are the only agents that are able to implement credit contracts. This provides an
integration of money and banking allong quite different lines from previous attempts in monetary search models.3 The
role of banks in this previous attempts is to provide a medium of exchange whereas the primary role of banks in Faig
(2004) is to intermediate between borrowers and lenders.
3 See for example Cavalcanti, Erosa, and Temzelides (1999) and He, Huang, and Wright (2003).
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